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On August 20, 2015, the Supreme Court of Kentucky issued two 
opinions addressing the deduction of post-production costs from royalty 
payments under oil and gas leases.  
In Baker v. Magnum Hunter, the court held that Kentucky is an “at the 
well” state, rather than following the “marketable product” approach to 
royalty calculations, whereby, absent language to the contrary, royalties 
under an oil and gas lease are calculated based on the value of the gas 
extracted at the well.1  In this case, two sets of landowners jointly brought 
suit seeking damages and a declaration of their rights, alleging that the 
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lessee production companies had miscalculated and underpaid royalties due 
under the leases.  The leases at hand provided that, with respect to gas, the 
“Lessee covenants and agrees…to pay Lessor one-eighth of the market 
price at the well for gas sold or for the gas so used from each well off the 
premises.”  The “at the well” rule provides that, if the gas is not sold at the 
well-head, but is refined or processed in some way and moved to a place of 
sale downstream from the well, in most jurisdictions, “royalties” 
entitlement remains its portion of the raw gas initially “produced,” so that 
in calculating “royalty,” the lessee may deduct from its downstream 
receipts any “post-production” costs incurred to market the gas.2  Due to 
the raw gas produced from the wells not being suitable for sale at the well, 
prior to sale, the Lessee gathers, compresses, and treats the raw gas, and 
then transports the enhanced product to downstream purchasers.  The 
Lessee then deducts its gathering, compression, treatment and 
transportation costs prior to calculating the landowners’ one-eighth royalty 
share on the remaining net revenue.  For the purposes of such valuation 
under standard “market price (value) at the well” royalty clauses, the lessee 
is solely responsible for the costs of production, of bringing the gas to the 
well, but post-production costs for such marketing-related enhancements as 
accumulating, compressing, processing and transporting the gas may be 
deducted from gross receipts before the calculation of the royalty share.3  
The Court noted that Kentucky law has long embraced the principles of “at 
the well” royalty calculations and thereby affirmed the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals decision upholding the valuation method.  
 In Appalachian Land Co. v. EQT Production Co., the court held that, 
absent language to the contrary, severance taxes cannot be deducted from 
royalties as a post-production cost and the producer severing natural gas 
from the earth is solely responsible for the payment of the severance tax; 
however, the rule may be altered through agreement.4  In this case, a 
natural gas lessor brought a class action against the lessee for the 
underpayment of royalties after the lessee deducted all post-extraction 
processing costs, including transportation and all severance taxes, from the 
sales price, and then paid the lessor one-eighth of the remainder.  KRS 
143A.020(1) states that “for the privilege of severing or processing natural 
resources in this state, a tax is hereby levied at the rate of four and one-half 
percent (4.5%) on natural gas…to apply to the gross value of the natural 
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resource.”  This tax applies to “all taxpayers severing and/or processing 
natural resources in this state…”5  “Severing” is defined as “the physical 
removal of the natural resource from the earth or waters of this state by any 
means.”6  “‘Processing’ includes but is not limited to breaking, crushing, 
cleaning, drying, sizing or loading or unloading for any purpose.”7  The 
court cited Burbank v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., which addressed the 
identical issue as it applies to oil severance taxes, whereby the Court held 
that the royalty owner was not liable for the tax or any portion thereof 
because “[t]he tax in its essence is . . . an occupation tax.  It is not laid on 
the land containing the ore, nor on the ore after removal, but on the business 
of mining the ore…”8  The Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded by 
stating that the severance tax was intended to be a levy for the privilege of 
severing or processing the gas.  Absent statutory or contractual 
apportionment, the tax is assessed exclusively to the producer/lessee.9 
Switching gears to the issue of eminent domain, in a ruling by the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals on May 22, 2015, in Bluegrass Pipeline 
Company, LLC v. Kentuckians United to Restrain Eminent Domain, Inc., 
the non-profit organization filed an action seeking a declaration of rights 
under KRS 278.502 as to the validity of the pipeline company’s claim that 
it had the power of eminent domain for the construction of the underground 
pipeline.10  Kentuckians United to Restrain Eminent Domain, Inc., is a non-
profit, incorporated under the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
whose sole purpose is “to protect Kentuckians from the threat of and 
attempts to exercise eminent domain by entities not in the public service to 
Kentuckians.”11  The Defendant, Bluegrass Pipeline Company, LLC, is a 
joint venture proposing a 24-inch pressurized underground pipeline for 
transporting natural gas liquids from the Marcellus and Utica shale 
formations to the Gulf of Mexico.  KRS 278.502 states: 
Any corporation or partnership organized for the purpose of, and 
any individual engaged in or proposing to engage in, 
constructing, maintaining or operating oil or gas wells or 
pipelines for transporting or delivering oil or gas, including oil 
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and gas products, in public service may, if it is unable to contract 
or agree with the owner after a good faith effort to do so, 
condemn the lands and material or use and occupation of the 
lands that are necessary for constructing, maintaining, drilling, 
utilizing and operating pipelines, underground oil or gas storage 
fields, and wells giving access thereto and all necessary 
machinery, equipment, pumping stations, appliances, and 
fixtures, including tanks and telephone lines, and other 
communication facilities, for use in connection therewith…12 
In affirming the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court, the Court of 
Appeals stated that KRS Chapter 278 is dedicated to the Public Service 
Commission (hereinafter “PSC”) and public utilities, whereas Bluegrass 
Pipeline Company is not regulated by the PSC, and that the legislature only 
intended to delegate the state’s power of eminent domain to those pipeline 
companies that are, or will be, regulated by the PSC.13  In addition, the 
natural gas liquids in Bluegrass’s pipeline are being transported to a facility 
in the Gulf of Mexico.  Because these natural gas liquids are not reaching 
Kentucky consumers, then Bluegrass Pipeline Company and its pipeline 
cannot be said to be in the public service of Kentucky, and subsequently, 
Bluegrass does not possess the ability to condemn property through eminent 
domain.14  
On March 10, 2016, in K. Petroleum, Inc. v. Property Tax Map Number 
7 Parcel 12, Knox County, Kentucky, et al., the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Southern Division, considered whether 
K. Petroleum (“KPI”), a private company that constructs, maintains and 
operates natural gas pipelines, could assert eminent domain to demand a 
right of way over the defendants’ property under Kentucky law.15  In this 
case, KPI began constructing the T-632 gas transmission pipeline on the 
defendants’ property and, because KPI incorrectly believed that it was 
constructing the pipeline on property over which it had already obtained 
rights, it did not seek condemnation of the property prior to construction.16  
As a result, KPI filed a condemnation action under the Kentucky eminent 
domain power granted in Ky. Rev. Stat. §278.502, whereby every exercise 
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of the power of eminent domain must be based on “public use” of the 
condemned property.17   
“Public Use” includes ownership or occupation by the Commonwealth 
or its entities . . . and “[t]he use of the property for the creation or operation 
of public utilities or common carriers.”18  In addition, “no property may be 
condemned primarily for the purpose of facilitating an incidental private 
use.”19 Under Ky. Rev. Stat. §278.470, “every company receiving, 
transporting or delivering a supply of oil or natural gas for public 
consumption is declared to be a common carrier, and the receipt, 
transportation and delivery of natural gas into, through and from a pipeline 
operated by any such company is declared to be a public use.”  However, 
Bluegrass Pipeline held that only pipeline companies “regulated by the 
PSC” may exercise Kentucky’s power of eminent domain.20  KPI 
demonstrated that is regulated by the PSC, as required by Bluegrass 
Pipeline, and, in addition, the pipeline actually serves Kentucky consumers, 
so it is distinguishable from the pipeline in Bluegrass Pipeline, which 
transported natural gas to the Gulf of Mexico.21  The court held that KPI 
established its ability to exercise eminent domain because it is regulated by 
the Public Service Commission and conveys natural gas to Kentucky 
consumers.     
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